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PAULA. LeBEL

Contributory Negligence and Mitigation
of Damages: Comparative Negligence
Through the Back Door?
A

comparative negligence bill I of general applica·
hility is currently pending before the General Assemhly. Passed by the House and carried over by the
Senate, the bill has, not surprisingly, elicited both
praise and condemnation. While attention has been
focused on the proposed legislative changes in the
effect of a plaintiffs contributory negligence, the
Supreme Court of Virginia issued an opinion, Lawrence v. Wirth, ~ that could represent a significant ero·
sion of the contributory negligence rule. This article
first examines the Supreme Court's distorted and
totally unnecessary treatment of contributory negligence in Lawrpncp. The article then explores the
Court's use of the concept of mitigation of damages to
accomplish many of the aims of the com parative negligence doctrine.

Lawrence v. Wirth: Revising
Contributory Negligence
The Supreme Court's disposition of the contributory negligence issue in Lawrence could, if extended
to other cases, substantially narrow the scope of
operation of the contributory negligence rule. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated, the Court did not
need to reinterpret the rule in order to permit recovery
by the plaintiff. The sequence of events as recounted
by the Court l is important for an understanding of
what the Court decided and for an appreciation of the
alternative ground the Court could have employed to
reach the same result. The following narrative has
been written in such a way as to highlight the critical
facts.
Plaintiff discovered a lump on her breast in June.
She consulted a physician who referred her to the
defendant after the physician w as unsuccessful in
aspirating th e lump. The defendant did not detect the
lump, but he was concerned about a different mass he
discovered, and performed a partial mastectomy in
August. Immediately after the surgery and again a
week la ter when the sutures were removed, plaintiff
called the defendant's attention to the original lump.

Although the defendant expressed no concern about
those reports, he did advise her to obtain medical
attention if she had further problems or detected subsequent changes. In October, the plaintiff noticed
that the lump had grown larger, but she delayed seeking medical attention until December, at which time
another surgeon performed a total mastectomy. A
year later, she was diagnosed as having terminal
metastatic bone cancer. Her oncologist identified the
August-December interval between surgical procedures as the period when the cancer metastasized.
The trial court sent the case to the jury with instruc·
tions that included contributory negligence. The
judgment entered on the verdict for the defendant
was set aside by the Supreme Court, holding that the
contributory negligence defense was not available in
these circumstances.
The Court based its holding on what was described
as "a well-established principle of tort law that, to har
recovery, a plaintiffs negligence must concur with
the defendant's. ~ The authority cited for that principle provides only the most tenuous support for the
proposition.-" While it is true that the cited case uses
the word "concurring," the factual setting of the case
and the context in which the word is used make it
clear that the authority will simply not hear the
burden of supporting the Court's use of the principle.
In a recent study of Lon Fuller's work in legal philosophy, Fuller's views on interpreting and applying
precedent are said to include the idea that "a judge is
not to seize on words and phrases in an opinion,
abstract them from their context, and apply them
more or less in accord with some assumed literal
meaning that they might be thought to have. liB An
examination of other Supreme Court decisions on
contributory negligence reveals that the Court in
[.atvrenc e has acted contrary to Fuller's notion of the
proper use of precedent, and has invested the idea of
plaintiffs and defendant's concurring negligence
with a new meaning.
Two cases decided in the last ten years provide a
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dramatic contrast with the "well-established principle
of tort law" that the Supreme Court relied on in LaiCren('e. In Reliah/r Stores Curporation v. Marsh. ' the
Supreme Court reversed a judgment for a plaintiff
who walked into a closed glass door marked with a
decal at approximately plaintiffs eye level. Entering
judgment for the defendant, the Court held that, as a
matter of law, plaintiff was negligent and her neglij.{encp was a proximate cause uf the injury. The Court
similarly approved keeping a contributury negligence
illllue from the jury in Reed v. Carlyle & Ma rtin. Tnc., '
in which the Court affirmed a summary judgment for
the defendants. The plaintiff was held to be cuntributorily negligent as a matter of law when he stood on
top of a load of silage while pitch forking the silage
into the moving beaters of a piece of equipment that
hnd been manufactured, repaired, and sold by the
various defendants. In neither of those cases is it
proper to say that the negligent conduct of the plaintiff was precisely concurrent with negligent conduct
of the defendant, if, as the Lau'reflce opinion suggests, concurrent conduct is interpreted tu mean contemporaneous events. The product liability defendants in Reed acted well before plaintiff climhed into
the silaj.{e, and the employees of the jewelry store in
Reliable Storrs had completed their actions \vi th
respect to the glass door priur to plaintiffs collision
with it. If, on the other hand, concurrent conduct can
be said to exist in Rrliable Stores and Reed in a continuing negligence sense that plaintiffs' conduct
occurn-'d while the effects of defendants' wrongful
conduct w('re still in uperation, then a fair reading of
the fa tcrellce facts would prod uce the same concl usion that was reached in the two earlier cases. ,Just as
the product ddendants in Recd created a condition in
which plaintiffs conduct became dang-erous, the surgeon's conduct in Lalcrenc(' created a condition in
which plaintiffs delay' in seeking medical attention
after detecting the enlarg-ed lump proved to he
dangerous.
/,([Il ' rl'flC(, thus either reprpspnts a distorted view of
concurring plaintiff and defendant negligence, or it is
a radical departure from prior applications of the contri butory nej.{ligence doctri ne-a departure th at su bstantially limits the availability of the doctrine.
Tested aganist /,all'rence standards, neither of the
plaintiffs in thl' two cases used for illustration would
be barred from recovery by the contributury neghgpnce dpfensp, because neithN plaintiffs conduct
precisely concurred with thl! negligent. conduct of till'
rpspectivp deppndants.
The rcsult-oripnted decision in /,([ICI"{'Tl('P fits into a
broadl'r pattern of appellatp court tn'atnwnt. of plaintilTs fault dl'fl'llses. T() the ext.m1t that plaintiffs fnult
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issups are deemed to be questions of fact.. appellate
courts must be wi II inj.{ to live with the results reached
by the factfinders,' 1ur the courts must tinker with the
legal rules so that the issues ca n be rpsol ved as matters of law. Viewed from this pt'rspl'ctive, Rdiahl('
St(}res and /,Gl.el"{'/I('(' arp oppositP siell's of tlw same
coin: in each case, the factfinders' ('haracterization of
t.he plaintiffs conduct was rejecte<i hy the Supreme
Court.
The most surprising feature uf t.he Supreme ('ourt's
decision in Lall'fI'1H'(' is thp Court's distortion of the
contributory negligl'ncp doct.rinp whl'n there existRd a
way of reaching the same rpsult t.hrough a perfectly
Ipgitimate application of l'UlTPnt d()ctrine. In order to
constitute the affirmativl' ell'fl'nsL' of ('ontl;butory
neg-ligence, plaintiffs conduct mu><t meet two requirements: it must be (a) unreasonable i " and (h) a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injur.v. ii Wlwthpr plaintiffs conduct was unn'asonahlp is a qupstion as to
...... hich there can be a ieg-itimatp di fference of opinion.
As noted earlier, treating such matters as qupstions
of fact requires courts to lw satisfied with thp result
the factfinders reach. While 1 have littl(~ trouble deciding til(' plaintiffs rpliance on the defendant's apparent. Io.ck of concern when she inquireci about thl' original lump ,vas a reasonable response to her October
discovery that the lump had grown, I also recognize
that the plaintiffs testim()n:-.' about her fear of
cancer :C! cuuld lead a factfinder to ('onclude that
plaintiffs dplay was hoth unrl'as()nahlp :-Inc! a direct
vioio.tion of the dpfpndant..'s advice to sppk further
attpntion if she noticpd a change in her ('on<iition.
Whatever onp-s vipw about the rpasonahleness of
plaintiffs conduct, the simple fact is thnt. thl' issue is
not one that should pver he suhmittpd to the factfinder. The second rpquirernent uf contrihutory' negligem,(,-the causation element-calls for a de('ision of
that issue fur the plaintiffin LalNf'II('/, as a matter of
law. The evidence relied on by the Supreme Court
indicated that metastasis occurrf:'d sometime' hetween
the surgical procedures Iwrformed in August and
Decem ber. 1.1 Focusing- on the October discovpry' of the
enlarged lump as the first date on which plaint.iffs
conduct could lw consid('f('d unreasonahlp, and assuming that her subsequent dela.v in seeking medical
advice was unreasonahle, giv('s t.he ('ourt two relevant periods of timl': (a) August -(ktolwr, when plaintiffs conduct was not unreasonable, ' I and (11) October-De(,pmher, when it was (assumed to be) unreasonublp. For plaintiffs unreasonabll' conduct to have
hl'l"n a CHuse of Iwr injury'. t.hen, metastasis must
have occurred during tlw latter ppri()d. Kl'cause contrihutor:-.' negligpncf:' is an affirmat.ive dpfense, t.he
hurdl'n is on til(' defendant. t.o ('swblish each of the

elements of the defense I-' Having given the defendant the lwne!it of the doubt on the characterization of
plaintiffs conduct as unreasonable, it is nevertheless
dear that defendant cannot satisfy his burden of
proof on the causation element. The prohahility that
metastasis occurred in the October-December period
is at best p(jually as great as that it occurred during
the August-Octoher period . Given the equally proba·
ble infcrf'ncE:'s to he drawn from the evidence, the
defendant, as the party with the burden of proof on
the contrihutory negligence defense, must be found to
have failed to satisfy that burden as a matter of law.
Given this state of the evidence. it would be en-or to
submit thp contributory negligence issue to a jury.
While plaintiffs conduct might be considered negligent. that npgligpncp was, as a mattBr of law, not a
legal CaUHl' of the plaintiffs harm.
My analysiH of contributory negligence in Lall'rell('e reHches the same result that was obtained by
thE:' Supreme Court: the jury may not bar plaintiffs
recoypry by applying the defense of contrihutory neg·
ligence. The Court reaches that result hy deciding
that the defense does not apply to the facts of the case.
My analysis. on the other hand. finds that the defense
does apply to the faelH, but concludes that the defendant cannot sustain hiH hurden of proof on the causation element of thl' defense. The difference between
theHe two approaches is not trivial. The analysis
offered in this article is, unlike that used by the Court,
consistent with prior rulings on contributory negligence. The Court's approach hints at a new view of
contributory negligence that will make the defense
unavailahll' in a widp range of cases where it pre·
viously applil'd.
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Mitigation of Damages and Comparative Fault
After holding that contributory negligence was not
applicablp to the facts of Lawren('e v. Wirth. the
Supreme Court then held that the plaintiffs conduct,
if unreasonablE:'. ('ould be considered by the jury in
mitigation of damages. I ii The remainder of this artiell' will focus on the similarity between this use of
mitigation of damagps and a general doctrine of
comparativp negligence.
Viewing till' Court's application of mitigation of
damages as a thinly disguised form of comparative
negligencl' requires no great leap of imagination.
Virginia 's railroad-crossing accident statute,17 ac·
knowledged to be a comparative negligence provi·
sion . ;k is worded in terms of mitigation of damages . If
the Court's use of mitigation of damages in l,aU 'N'lIce
were to be widely applil'd. the result would be that the
Court would havl' adopted by common law a measure
that iH closer to pure comparative negligence, and

thus more favorable to tort plaintiffs , than the version of comparative negligence now pending before
the state legislature.
The comparative negligence hill approved by the
House is a "51 '7<, bar" provision .I!! Plaintiffs recovery
is reduced hy the proportion of plaintilrs negligence
as long as plaintiffs negligence does not exceed 50%.
If plaintiffs negligence is greater than that of the
other parties ?) i.e., ;'il'!';, or more, the contributory neg·
ligence rule reenters the case and operates as a total
bar to plaintiffs recovery. The Court's UHe of the mitigation of damages defense in Lawrence seems to
leave open the possihility that a plaintiffs unreasonable failure to mitigate damages could he held
responsible for f)I 'V" or more of the damages plaintiff
suffered , allowing plaintiff to recover less than ;')0'7<, of
those damages. However. if the unreasonable failure
to mitigate wefe deemed to be negligE'nce on the part

of the plaintiff, then assigning responsibility for 51%
or more of the damages to plaintiffs conduct would
result in no recovery for the plaintiff under the type of
comparative negligence statute currently being considered by the legislature.
The Supreme Court of Virginia may well understand the difference between unreasonable conduct
that is negligent and unreasonable conduct that fails
to mitigate damages. Similarly, if the comparative
negligence statute should be enacted in its present
form, the Court may also have occasion to point out
the difference between unreasonable conduct that
fails to reach the recovery-barring threshold of a 51')'1,
bar comparative negligence statute and unreasonable
conduct that fails to mitigate, and thus eliminates
recovery of, some proportion from 5PYil to 99 lPh of plaintiffs damages.~l I do not mean in any way to suggest
that those differences do not exist, or that the Court is
being specious or disingenuous if it says it recognizes
them. Rut the application of th'ese concepts is normally going to be turned over to a factfinder unfamiliar with, and untrained in making, such fine distinctions. Whether or not the Supreme Court purposely
blurs the boundary line between contributory or comparative negligence and mitigation of damages, a
common sense appraisal of what jurors are capable of
doing suggest.s that such blurring is an inevitable
result of turning such matters over to juries.
The discussion so far has assumed that the Court's
use of a mitigation of damages defense was appropriate in Lawrence. and that the problematic aspect
of such use concerns its likely slippage into a more
general practice of comparative fault decisionmaking
disguised as something else. But an examination of
the Lawrence case suggests that the Court is replacing a recovery-barring contrihutory negligence defense
with a recovery-limiting defense in a situation where
use of the latter kind of defense is inappropriate. A
review of the leading treatises indicates that the preferred lahel to attach to the defense that the Court
uses is "avoidable consequences" rather than "mitig-ation of damages." ~~ The avoidable consequences
rule prevents a plaintiff from recovering damages for
a harm that could have heen avoided had the plaintiff
acted reasonahly after the commission of the tort. ~:I
There are a number of technical legal arguments why
this rule docs not apply to the facts of Lau'rcl1cc.
The avoidable consequences rule is concerned with
what a plaintiff could have done "after the commission of the tort." ~ l The event descrihed hy that last
phrase needs to be distinguished from a different
even t. tl1P defendant's . .vrongful conduct. rf the avoidahle consequences rule was framed in terms of plaintiffs conduct after the defendant\; wrongful conduct,
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then a case might be mad!> for applying the rule to
Mrs. Lawrence, because her delay in seeking' medical
attention did occur after the defendant's conduct.
Rut the commission of a tort is not complete upon
defendant's conduct. At least when the action is
based on a negligence theory of liability, the tort is
not complete until the defendant's breach of a duty of
care owed to the plaintiff has proximately caused
some legally cognizable harm to the plaintiff. Thus,
until plaintiff suffers harm, there has been no tort of
negligence, even though it might be possible to characterize the defimdant's conduct as negligent. 2s In the
Lawrence situation, the harm produced by the defendant's conduct would be the worsening of plaintiffs
condition, i.e., metastasis. It is only upon metastasis
that the defendant's tort has heen committed. Hecause
the exact date of metastasis cannot be determined,
any conclusion that plaintiff's delay in obtaining
medical attention occurred after the commission of
the tort would be pure speculation. The Lawr(,l1c('
situation, given the set of facts described by the
Supreme Court, does not satisfy the terms of the
avoidable consequences rule.
Prosser offers a different explanation of the avoidable consequences rule. but even under his version,
the rule would not be properly applied to the l,aU'·
renee case. Prosser suggests that the avoidable consequences rule is triggered only when it is feasihle to
assign damages to the separate negligence of defendant and plaintifPH When such a division of damages
is not possible, the appropriate defense is contributory negligence, not avoidable ('onsequences.~ ~ A consideration of alternati ve assumptions demonstrates
that Prosser's method of applying the avoidable con·
sequences rule ought not to lead to the result reached
by the Court in Lawrpnc('. Assllmp first that metastasis occurred prior to October. In that case, the damag-es from plaintiffs terminal illness are incapable of
apportionment between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs conduct. Death is. as Prosser puts it. a "single
indi visible result ... incapable of any reasonable or
practical division. "~~ The assumption that metastasis
occurred between October and December does bring
Prosser's version of the avoidable consequences rule
into play. If the evidence supported that hypothesis. a
factfinder could conclude that metastasis was avoid·
able hy the plaintiffs prompt consultation \',~th
another physician who would arrange for surgery to
remove the tumor before metastasis. In this effective
treatment scenario, those damages attributable to
metastasis could be deemed avoidable. with the
defendant heing held respon sible only for :"llch damages as might be connected with tlw necessity to perform a second mastectomy on the plaintiff. However.

just as was the casp under the contributory negliJ;{ence
defense /~' any choice between the competing assumptions about when metastasis occurred would be arhitrary. As with contributory negligence, the defendant,
as the party who bears the burden of proving that
damages were avoidahle,'11l must have the issue
decided against him as a matter of law in this situation where the competing assumptions are equally
prohahle.

Conclusion
This article has focused on the technical flaws In
the Supreme Court's consideration of defenses based
on the plaintiffs conduct in Lawrenc(' v. Wirth. As
demonstrated above, the facts relied on by the Court
do not call for the submission of plaintiffs conduct
defenses to the jury. The significance of the Court's
decision , however, extends beyond the doctrinal criticism of the Court's treatment of contributory negligence and mitigation of damages.
When dealing with a basis of liability such as negligence, in which community attitudes about proper
conduct and appropriate compensation are legitimately expressed through a jury's setting and applyinJ;{ a J;{eneral standard of reasonahle care, appellate
courts have a special ohligation to display clarity,
consistency and coherence. Those attributes are necessary if the assignment of decisionmaking responsibility to the community representatives on the jury is
both to work and to he seen to work. The perception of
proper functioning may be just as important as the
functioning itself, for without that perception, the
legitimacy of the body of tort rules, if not of the legal
system itself, is put in jeopardy.
Juries should be free to allocate losses within a
framework of legal rules that clarify rather than ohscure the range of the jury's prerogative and the policy implications of the competing decisions. If the
total bar to recovery contemplated by a contributory
neJ;{lig-ence rule is no longer consistent with the fairness and efficiency goals oftort law, the proper course
of action is for the court or the legislature to modify or
replace the rule.
Decisions such as Lawrence may have the palliative effect of relieving some of the tension between the
results that a questionable rule requires and those the
decisionmakers want. The harsh recovery-barring
effect of the contributory negligence rule is avoided
through a narrowing construction of its applicability,
while the comparative features of the obvious substitute rule of comparative negligence are injected into
the decision under the cover of a mitigation of damages instruction to the jury. But that relief of tension
may be accomplished at a substantial cost to the legal

profession, tryinJ;{ to understand the leJ;{al rules that
will govern a particular case, and to the public, which
ought to perceive that acceptable results can be
achieved because of the rules, rather than in spite of
the rules.

FOOTI\OTES

I. House Hill No. 107 provides:

He it enacted by the General Assembly uf Virginia:
I. That the code uf Virginia is amended by adding in
Article :1 uf Chapter :) uf Title R.O l a sectiun numbered
R.0l·44.2 as follows :
§R.01·44.2. Contrihutory negligence nut bar to re ·
covery.-Tn all actions brought hereafter for persunal
injury , wrongful death or property damage, the f<let thHt
the persun injured ur killed, or the owner of the damaged
property ur person having contrul uver the pruperty, may
hHve bCl'n guilty of contributory negligence shHll nut bar
recovery, but the damages shall be diminished in propur·
tion tu the amuunt uf negligence attribuwble to such per·
sons. Huwever, such person shall recuver only if such per·
son's negligence i:,; not greater than the combined negli·
gence of <lll other parties.
Assumption of risk may still be asserted as a defense
where a perl"on fully underMands <l risk of harm to him~elf
or his property caused by another's negligent conduct and
who nevertheless voluntarily chuuses to accept th<lt risk.
2. 226 Va. 40R, ::l09 S.E.2d :11" (l~K:\l.
:l. /d . at 410·12, :-109 S. E.2d at :1l6·17.
4. ld. at 412, :109 S .E.20 at :-117 (emphasis in original).
:1. Chf'sapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. But.ier, 179 Va. 609, 20 S.E.2d
;,16 (1942).
n. R. Summcrs. Lon L. Fullpr lI2(19~H).
7. 21k Va. 1005,24:1 S.K2d 210 (l97R).
R. 2 1·1 Va. fi92, 202 S.E.2d R74, cert. delliNf. 41 ~J U.S. H.'i9
(I n74)
~ . .'Icc. (".g .. Stl"l 'e llS v . Ford Molor ('I) .. 220 Va. 41 ~'>. :~O~
S. E.2d :119 (l91'\:\), decided the same day as Lau'r{'lln'. in which
the Court held that the ability uf reasun<lble persons to rl'ach
different cunclusions from the evidence concerning an Hssump·
tioo uf risk defense precluded the trial court from deciding that
issue flS fl matttRr oflaw. See a/so VEPCO v. Willesell. 22;' Va.
4;')9, :10:3 S.F:.2d 1\nR (\91\~i), holding that plaintiffs decedent's
cunduct could nut be ruled cuntributury neg-ligencl' as a matter
of law.
10. SI'I'. e.R., Whitfipld v. Dunll, 202 Va. 172, 117 S.E.2r! :)7:\
(1961).
I!. Rpliab/c Slores Corp. v. Morsh. 21H Va. 100.').1007.24:1
S.K2d 219,221 (1971'\)
12. S'ep 226 Va. at 411, :109 S.F:.2d at :116.
I:l. Id.
14. Defendant might argue that during this period plaintiff
W<lS unreasonable in not obtaining H secund opinion. That the
Supreme Court W<lS nut operating on that premise is apparent
from the Court's handling of the concurrent negligence iAsue. 1f
a failure tu obtain <l second opiniun is to be considered negligent
on the part of the pl<lintiff, that failure did concur, at least in
part, with the Hlleged negligence of the defendant between the
Rurgery and the remov<ll of the sutures. Thu~ it is not until the
October discovery of the enlarged lump that plnintiffs conduct
can first he considered unreasonable.
I;l. S"" Burks v. Webb. 199 Va. 296, 99 S.E.:hl 6R:l (19!17).
IIi. 226 Va. at 412· 1:1, :109 S.E.2d at ::I17·IH.
17. Va. Codd 56-416 (1981)
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IH . .'ieI'. ('./-I .. lllarf"lk & Hi. Ry. v. Gilliam. 211 Va. ;)42. 17S
S. E.2d 499 (1971 l: Chesapeake & 0. fl.Y. v. Pulliam. I W, Va. 901-\,
f116. ~I S.E.2d :),1, ;')1-\ (1947). Dean Wade uses this provision to
identify Virginia a>:; a enntributory negligence Atate that has a
statute "applying comparative negligence in a limited area."
Wade. Camparatiup Nej{lij{enc('-Its Del'eiopmenl in (he United
.'itatl's and Its P,,'s('nt Status in Louisiana. ·10 r ~'1. 1,. Rev. 2~)9,
;lO6 ( 19HO).
19. Pears()n, Apportionment "f rasses Undn ('amparatil'e
Fuult Laws-An Analysis af the Alternatil'ps. 40 La. L. Rev.
:3·1:l, :lfi:3 (I ~)SO1
20. The bill's reference to "other parties" is unnecessarily
ambiguous. See Pearson supra note 19, at ::l55-57. See also BradIpy v. Appalachian Pou.." Cn .. 256 S.E.2d 879,885 (W.Va. 1979),
holding that "a party is not barred from recovering damages in
a tort action so long as his negligence or fault does not equal or
exceed th(' combined negligen('e or fault of th" other parties
inuolued in the accident." (emphasis added), noted in Cady,
Alas and Alack, Modified Comparative Nef:[lif:[f'nce Comes to
West Virginia, S2 W.Va. L. Rev. 473, 4S5 n.64 (19S0). Consider a
J--car accident, in which Driver A is 35% negligent, R is 40%
negligent, and C is 25% negligent. If A sues Band C, the proposed statute would permit A to recover fifi% of his damages,
despite the fact that A's negligence is greater than that of one of
the defendants. However, suppose A is unable to obtain jurisdiction over H. <lnd proceed1i to trial solely against C. If the rele·
vant language is interpreted to mean "persons involved in the
accident," A's recovery would not be barred, although the court
would face the problems associated with determining the proportion of fault properly attributable to a person who is not a
party to the action. See Chamallas, Comparative Fault and
Multipl(' p(lrty l.itij{(ltion jnl,ouisian(l: A Samplinj{ uf the Proh·
lems. 40 La. L. Rev. ::l7::J, 389·91 (191-\0). Tf, on the other hand, the
langauge means "parties (defendant) to the lawsuit," then A's
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recovery would be harred.
21. For example, a plaintiffs conduct may he ('ontrihutorily
negligent but only equal to the negligence of the defendant, so
that plaintiffs recovery woold not be bHrred. As long as failure
to mitigate damages is different from the contrihutory negligence defenRe, one could imagine a caRe in whkh this hypothetical plaintiffwho~e recovery is not barred by contributory negli·
gence may end up with a recovery of less than PiO'll, of his
damages, after a reduction for failure to mitigate is added to the
5()')'o reduction under the comparative negligence provision. The
problem does not arise in a contributory negligence jurisdiction,
because once the contributory nf'gligence defense applies, plaintiffs recovery is totHlIy harred, leaving no recovery on which
the failure to mitigate defense would operate.
22. D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of H.emedies IRR (197:1);
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 4!)S-fi9 Uith ed. 1')R4).
Justicp Poffs spparHte opini()n notes thp ('orred tnminolog-y.
S('(' 22fi Va. at -I H. :;09 S.E.2d at :llS.
2:3. Se(' Restatement (Second) of Torts ~91 S ( I ~177).
24. ld.
25. The key distinction is hdween l1t'glig-ence as a cause of
action and negligenc(' as a way ()f characterizing conduct. See
W. Prosser, J. Wadr & V. Schwartz, Cases and Materials on
Torts 144 (7th ed. 19H2). Sec also Locilc v. Johns ·;\I!ant·ill(, Corp.,
221 Va. (:)f'>1, 27fi S. E.2d 900 (19H I); Gnzy v. American Radiatur &
Standurd Sanitary Corp. 22 lB. 2d 4:)2. 4:16. 176 .\I.E.2d 76 1. 763
(J 961): "To be tortious an act must cause injury. The c()ncept of
injury is an inReparahle part of the phras('."
26. Prosser, supra note 22, at 4;,H-;"J.
27. ld. at ·1:,9.
2R Id. at :W,.
29. ,""I' supra notes 1:1-1" and accomp<lnying t<'xt.
:10. Dobbs, 811pra now 22, nt ;)S l.

